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1	  
Trinity	  Lutheran	  Church	  v.	  Comer:	  	  Paradigm	  Lost?	  Ira	  C.	  Lupu	  &	  Robert	  W.	  Tuttle1	  
From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  American	  republic,	  federal	  and	  state	  constitutions	  have	  recognized	  the	  distinctive	  character	  of	  houses	  of	  worship.2	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  distinctiveness	  does	  not	  put	  houses	  of	  worship	  outside	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  law.	  	  If	  one	  of	  their	  agents	  injures	  someone	  in	  the	  course	  of	  her	  duties,	  the	  religious	  employer	  is	  responsible	  in	  tort	  law,	  just	  like	  any	  other	  entity.3	  	  But	  when	  their	  distinctively	  religious	  activities	  are	  in	  question—for	  example,	  choosing	  a	  theological	  spokesperson,4	  or	  organizing	  religious	  instruction	  of	  children	  within	  their	  community—constitutional	  limits	  of	  various	  kinds	  kick	  in.	  	  These	  limits	  ordinarily	  take	  two	  distinct	  and	  complementary	  forms.	  	  First,	  the	  government	  is	  constitutionally	  disabled	  from	  dictating	  who	  leads	  worship,	  or	  regulating	  its	  content.	  	  The	  state	  may	  not	  establish	  criteria	  for	  ministry,5	  nor	  may	  it	  dictate	  or	  outlaw	  particular	  prayers	  or	  liturgical	  forms.	  	  Second,	  the	  government	  is	  constitutionally	  forbidden	  from	  proselytizing,	  subsidizing	  worship,	  or	  promoting	  other	  specifically	  religious	  activities.	  	  It	  may	  not	  spend	  to	  pay	  the	  salaries	  of	  privately	  employed	  clergy,6	  or	  the	  costs	  of	  construction	  of	  worship	  space.7	  	  These	  propositions	  have	  long	  been	  deeply	  settled	  in	  American	  jurisprudence.	  	  The	  opening	  words	  of	  the	  First	  Amendment	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution,8	  and	  the	  constitutions	  of	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  the	  states,9	  reflect	  these	  norms.	  	  
1	  The	  authors	  are	  both	  affiliated	  with	  George	  Washington	  University.	  Ira	  C.	  Lupu	  is	  the	  F.	  Elwood	  &	  2	  See	  Trinity	  Lutheran	  Church	  of	  Columbia,	  Inc.	  v.	  Comer,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  2012,	  2033-­‐35	  (Sotomayor,	  J.,	  dissenting)	  (discussing	  prohibitions	  on	  public	  funding	  of	  houses	  of	  worship).	  3	  Ira	  C.	  Lupu	  and	  Robert	  W.	  Tuttle,	  Sexual	  Misconduct	  and	  Ecclesiastical	  Immunity,	  2004	  BYU	  L.	  Rev.	  1789,	  1797-­‐1800	  (2004).	  4	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor	  Evangelical	  Lutheran	  Church	  and	  School	  v.	  EEOC,	  565	  U.S.	  171	  (2012).	  5	  Id.;	  see	  generally	  Ira	  C.	  Lupu	  and	  Robert	  W.	  Tuttle,	  The	  Mystery	  of	  Unanimity	  in	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor	  
Evangelical	  Lutheran	  Church	  and	  School	  v.	  EEOC,	  20	  Lewis	  &	  Clark	  L.	  Rev.	  1265	  (2017).	  6	  The	  government	  may	  pay	  the	  salaries	  of	  the	  chaplains	  it	  employs.	  	  We	  explore	  the	  questions	  raised	  by	  the	  chaplaincy	  in	  Ira	  C.	  Lupu	  &	  Robert	  W.	  Tuttle,	  SECULAR	  GOVERNMENT,	  RELIGIOUS	  PEOPLE	  251-­‐262	  (Wm.	  B.	  Eerdmans	  Pub.	  Co.	  2014),	  and	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Ira	  C.	  Lupu	  &	  Robert	  W.	  Tuttle,	  Instruments	  of	  
Accommodation:	  The	  Military	  Chaplaincy	  and	  the	  Constitution,	  110	  W.	  Va.	  L.	  Rev.	  89	  (2007).	  7	  See	  Committee	  for	  Public	  Education	  and	  Religious	  Liberty	  v.	  Nyquist,	  413	  U.S.	  756	  (1973);	  Tilton	  v.	  Richardson,	  403	  U.S.	  672	  (1971).	  For	  deeper	  discussion	  of	  the	  historical	  limitations	  on	  public	  funding	  for	  construction	  of	  houses	  of	  worship,	  see	  Ira	  C.	  Lupu	  &	  Robert	  W.	  Tuttle,	  Historic	  Preservation	  Grants	  
to	  Houses	  of	  Worship:	  A	  Case	  Study	  in	  the	  Survival	  of	  Separationism,	  43	  B.C.	  L.	  REV.	  1139	  (2002).	  Those	  who	  challenge	  the	  distinctive	  constitutional	  role	  of	  religious	  institutions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  rights,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Micah	  Schwartzman	  &	  Richard	  Schragger,	  Against	  Institutionalism,	  99	  Va.	  L.	  Rev.	  2013,	  may	  beinadvertently	  undermining	  that	  distinctive	  role	  in	  the	  context	  of	  limits	  on	  public	  funding	  of	  religious	  experience.	  8	  “Congress	  shall	  make	  no	  law	  respecting	  an	  establishment	  of	  religion	  or	  prohibiting	  the	  free	  exercise	  thereof	  .	  .	  .”	  	  U.S.	  Const.,	  amend.	  I.	  9	  See	  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2037	  n.10	  and	  n.11.	  (Sotomayor,	  J.,	  dissenting).	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  With	  respect	  to	  matters	  of	  funding	  and	  support,	  proponents	  of	  expansive	  theories	  of	  religious	  privilege	  have	  attempted	  over	  the	  past	  thirty-­‐five	  years	  to	  undermine	  the	  paradigm	  of	  distinctiveness.	  	  A	  standard	  move	  in	  that	  effort	  is	  the	  portrayal	  of	  that	  distinctiveness	  as	  a	  form	  of	  discrimination.	  	  In	  our	  discrimination-­‐sensitive	  culture,	  this	  is	  an	  understandable	  and	  sometimes	  potent	  theme,	  especially	  in	  cases	  involving	  claims	  of	  equal	  access	  of	  religious	  speakers	  to	  public	  fora.10	  	  	  	  Before	  this	  past	  Supreme	  Court	  Term,	  however,	  the	  paradigm	  of	  nondiscrimination	  had	  not	  come	  close	  to	  overtaking	  the	  longstanding	  paradigm	  under	  which	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  imposes	  a	  strict	  and	  distinctive	  limit	  on	  the	  state’s	  power	  to	  fund	  houses	  of	  worship.	  This	  limitation	  on	  state	  funding	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  secular	  non-­‐profit	  institutions	  and,	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  religious	  institutions	  that	  are	  not	  houses	  of	  worship.	  	  The	  distinctive	  limitation	  imposed	  by	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  is	  diametrically	  opposed	  to	  the	  nondiscrimination	  model.	  In	  the	  constitutional	  universe	  of	  distinctive	  treatment,,	  government	  financial	  support	  for	  the	  religious	  activities	  of	  churches	  is	  forbidden.	  	  Under	  non-­‐discrimination	  norms,	  government	  financial	  support	  for	  churches	  is	  required,	  not	  simply	  permitted,	  whenever	  the	  state	  supports	  comparable	  secular	  activity.	  	  Viewed	  against	  that	  backdrop,	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Trinity	  
Lutheran	  Church	  v.	  Comer11	  (hereafter	  “TLC”)	  represents	  a	  stunning	  and	  thoroughly	  unacknowledged	  move	  from	  the	  religion-­‐distinctive	  principle	  of	  “no	  funding”	  to	  one	  of	  nondiscrimination.	  TLC	  involved	  Missouri’s	  program	  for	  grants	  to	  subsidize	  the	  cost	  of	  resurfacing	  playgrounds	  with	  materials	  from	  scrap	  rubber	  tires.	  	  The	  Church	  applied	  for	  a	  grant,	  and	  the	  Missouri	  Department	  of	  Public	  Resources	  denied	  the	  Church’s	  application	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  provision	  in	  the	  State	  Constitution	  that	  prohibits	  public	  funding	  of	  houses	  of	  worship.12	  The	  provision,	  one	  of	  many	  similar	  provisions	  found	  across	  state	  constitutions,	  deserves	  quotation	  in	  full:13	  	  	  That	  no	  money	  shall	  ever	  be	  taken	  from	  the	  public	  treasury,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  in	  aid	  of	  any	  church,	  sect	  or	  denomination	  of	  religion,	  or	  in	  aid	  of	  any	  priest,	  preacher,	  minister	  or	  teacher	  thereof,	  as	  such;	  and	  that	  no	  preference	  shall	  be	  given	  to	  nor	  any	  discrimination	  made	  against	  any	  church,	  sect	  or	  creed	  of	  religion,	  or	  any	  form	  of	  religious	  faith	  or	  worship. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Rosenberger	  v.	  Rector	  and	  Visitors	  of	  the	  Univ.	  of	  Virginia,	  515	  U.S.	  819	  (1995);	  Lamb’s	  Chapel	  v.	  Center	  Moriches	  Union	  Free	  School	  Dist.,	  508	  U.S.	  384	  (1993);	  Widmar	  v.	  Vincent,	  454	  U.S.	  263	  (1981).	  11	  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2014-­‐20.	  12	  The	  Church’s	  application	  ranked	  fifth	  of	  44	  received	  that	  year,	  and	  the	  Department	  made	  14	  grants.	  
Id.	  at	  2018.	  The	  Church	  thus	  would	  have	  received	  a	  grant	  but	  for	  the	  state	  constitutional	  limitation.	  	  We	  do	  wonder	  why	  the	  Department	  bothered	  to	  rank	  the	  Church’s	  application,	  unless	  it	  knew	  this	  lawsuit	  was	  coming	  and	  it	  was	  helping	  pave	  the	  way.	  13	  Missouri	  Const.,	  Art.	  I,	  sec.	  7.	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In	  response,	  the	  Church	  sued	  the	  responsible	  state	  officials.	  	  The	  Church	  asserted	  that	  the	  denial,	  which	  rested	  on	  a	  constitutional	  provision	  requiring	  distinctive	  treatment	  for	  houses	  of	  worship,	  violated	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause	  and	  Equal	  Protection	  Clause	  of	  the	  federal	  constitution.	  	  Missouri	  “conceded”	  that	  the	  grant	  would	  not	  violate	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  of	  the	  First	  Amendment,	  though	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  doubt	  the	  accuracy	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  that	  concession.	  	  As	  Justice	  Sotomayor	  forcefully	  elaborates	  in	  her	  dissent,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  had	  never	  before	  permitted	  –	  much	  less	  required	  –	  state	  financial	  subsidy	  for	  a	  house	  of	  worship.	  	  Moreover,	  Missouri’s	  concession	  should	  have	  been	  entirely	  irrelevant.	  Parties	  to	  a	  legal	  dispute	  may	  not	  waive	  an	  Establishment	  Clause	  violation	  if	  one	  exists.	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  the	  courts	  at	  every	  stage	  should	  have	  addressed	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  issue.	  	  As	  the	  litigation	  proceeded,	  however,	  the	  courts	  focused	  exclusively	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause	  requires	  equal	  treatment	  of	  houses	  of	  worship.	  	  The	  state	  contended	  that	  it	  had	  lawful	  discretion	  to	  exclude	  churches	  from	  the	  program	  without	  unconstitutionally	  discriminating	  against	  them.	  The	  lower	  courts	  rejected	  the	  Church’s	  arguments	  of	  unconstitutional	  discrimination,14	  sustained	  the	  state’s	  authority	  under	  its	  constitution	  to	  exclude	  churches	  from	  the	  program,	  and	  ordered	  dismissal	  of	  the	  suit.15	  	  As	  we	  explain	  below,	  the	  question	  presented	  in	  TLC—does	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause	  require	  a	  state	  to	  treat	  houses	  of	  worship	  identically	  with	  other	  non-­‐profit	  entities	  seeking	  a	  discretionary	  grant	  aimed	  at	  enhancing	  safety?—undeniably	  required	  significant	  engagement	  with	  the	  constitutional	  tradition,	  state	  and	  federal,	  of	  restriction	  on	  government	  funding	  of	  churches.	  The	  grant	  would	  pay	  to	  improve	  the	  surface	  of	  a	  playground	  used	  at	  a	  Church	  pre-­‐school,	  and	  the	  mission	  of	  the	  pre-­‐school	  included	  religious	  training.	  	  That	  training	  could	  occur	  outdoors	  as	  well	  as	  indoors.	  	  It	  was	  therefore	  profoundly	  puzzling	  when	  seven	  Justices16	  supported	  a	  ruling	  in	  the	  Church’s	  favor	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  concern	  about	  discrimination,	  while	  ignoring	  the	  constitutional	  norms	  of	  distinctive	  treatment	  for	  houses	  of	  worship.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Although	  Trinity	  Lutheran	  advanced	  an	  equal	  protection	  argument	  as	  well	  as	  a	  free	  exercise	  claim,	  the	  equal	  protection	  theory	  went	  nowhere	  in	  the	  lower	  courts	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  said	  nothing	  about	  it.	  	  This	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  consistent	  Supreme	  Court	  practice	  of	  treating	  cases	  about	  religious	  discrimination	  exclusively	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  Religion	  Clause	  concern.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Church	  of	  the	  Lukumi	  Babalu	  Aye,	  Inc.	  v.	  Hialeah,	  508	  U.S.	  520	  (1993)	  (discrimination	  against	  Santerian	  practitioners	  violates	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause);	  Kiryas	  Joel	  School	  District	  v.	  Grumet,	  512	  U.S.	  687	  (1994)	  (legislative	  favoring	  particular	  sect	  of	  Orthodox	  Jews	  violates	  the	  Establishment	  Clause);	  Larson	  v.	  Valente,	  456	  U.S.	  228	  (1982)	  (denominational	  preference	  in	  state	  regulation	  of	  fundraising	  by	  religious	  groups	  violates	  the	  Establishment	  Clause).	  	  15	  Trinity	  Lutheran	  Church	  of	  Columbia,	  Inc.	  v.	  Pauley,	  976	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1137,	  1151	  (W.D.	  Mo.	  2013),	  
aff’d	  788	  F.3d	  779,	  784	  (8th	  Cir.	  2015).	  16	  	  Six	  Justices	  (Chief	  Justice	  Roberts,	  and	  Justices	  Kennedy,	  Thomas,	  Alito,	  Kagan,	  and	  Gorsuch)	  joined	  the	  opinion,	  except	  for	  a	  crucial	  footnote	  that	  Justices	  Thomas	  and	  Gorsuch	  did	  not	  join.	  The	  opinion	  of	  the	  Court	  is	  thus	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts’s	  opinion,	  minus	  that	  footnote	  which	  reads,	  “This	  case	  involves	  express	  discrimination	  based	  on	  religious	  identity	  with	  respect	  to	  playground	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Only	  the	  dissenting	  opinion	  by	  Justice	  Sotomayor,	  joined	  by	  Justice	  Ginsburg,	  invoked	  the	  relevant	  seventy	  years	  of	  Supreme	  Court	  precedent	  and	  200	  years	  of	  constitutional	  history	  that	  constitute	  that	  backdrop.	  	  The	  dissenters	  concluded	  that,	  unless	  the	  funding	  agency	  restricted	  playground	  use	  to	  secular	  activity,	  the	  grant	  would	  have	  raised	  serious	  Establishment	  Clause	  questions,	  and	  that	  Missouri	  was	  therefore	  well	  within	  its	  constitutional	  discretion	  to	  deny	  the	  grant	  pursuant	  to	  its	  general	  no-­‐funding	  policy.	  	  	   Despite	  this	  forceful	  and	  detailed	  dissent,	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts’	  opinion	  for	  the	  Court	  focused	  exclusively	  on	  discrimination	  based	  on	  “religious	  identity.”	  	  The	  Court’s	  opinion	  asserted	  that	  Missouri’s	  interest	  in	  church-­‐state	  separation—described	  superficially	  and	  dismissively	  as	  a	  “policy	  preference”—cannot	  justify	  such	  discrimination.	  If	  a	  state	  creates	  a	  public	  benefit	  for	  secular	  purposes	  (here,	  playground	  safety	  and	  disposal	  of	  scrap	  tires),	  the	  state	  may	  not	  categorically	  exclude	  houses	  of	  worship.	  	  That	  the	  benefit	  was	  not	  universally	  or	  even	  widely	  available	  made	  no	  difference.17	  	  	  	  	  The	  paradigm	  of	  nondiscrimination	  is	  front	  and	  center,	  and	  forms	  the	  opinion’s	  emotional	  pivot.	  	  Near	  the	  end,	  the	  opinion	  uses	  the	  line	  “no	  churches	  need	  apply”18	  to	  describe	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  Missouri	  scheme.	  	  This	  was	  factually	  accurate,	  but	  its	  form	  is	  clearly	  designed	  to	  evoke	  the	  invidious	  discrimination	  associated	  with	  exclusion	  of	  members	  of	  particular	  races,	  nationalities,	  or	  religions	  from	  employment	  opportunity.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  appeals	  to	  precisely	  the	  same	  concern	  about	  prejudice	  in	  the	  very	  last	  section	  of	  the	  opinion,	  in	  which	  he	  invokes	  Maryland’s	  long-­‐ago	  exclusion	  of	  Jews	  from	  public	  office.19	  The	  opinion	  thus	  deliberately	  obscures	  the	  constitutional	  difference	  between	  discrimination	  against	  individuals	  because	  of	  their	  religious	  identity,	  and	  generically	  distinctive	  treatment	  of	  all	  houses	  of	  worship.	  	  	   True	  to	  its	  tenacious	  inclinations	  to	  avoid	  the	  paradigm	  of	  distinctive	  treatment	  of	  religious	  institutions,	  the	  Court	  opinion	  relies	  primarily	  on	  decisions	  that	  involve	  neither	  religious	  institutions,	  nor	  discretionary	  benefits	  made	  available	  to	  them	  by	  the	  state.	  	  McDaniel	  v.	  Paty20	  held	  that	  Tennessee’s	  prohibition	  on	  ordained	  ministers	  serving	  in	  the	  state	  legislature	  violated	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause.	  	  
McDaniel	  involved	  individuals,	  not	  religious	  institutions,	  and	  implicated	  a	  separate	  constitutional	  right	  to	  run	  for	  and	  hold	  state	  office.	  	  Church	  of	  Lukumi	  Babalu	  Aye	  v.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  resurfacing.	  We	  do	  not	  address	  religious	  uses	  of	  funding	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  discrimination.”	  Trinity	  
Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2024	  n.3.	  Later	  in	  this	  article,	  we	  will	  explore	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  note.	  	  	  Justice	  Breyer	  concurred	  separately.	  	  17	  The	  relatively	  scarcity	  of	  the	  benefit	  makes	  it	  quite	  different	  from	  matters	  of	  “common	  right,”	  like	  police	  and	  fire	  protection,	  available	  to	  all	  in	  the	  community.	  	  See	  Everson	  v.	  Bd.	  of	  Educ.	  330	  U.S.	  1,	  60-­‐61(1947)	  (Rutledge,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  18	  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2024.	  19	  Id.	  	  20	  435	  U.S.	  618	  (1978).	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Hialeah21	  involved	  coercive	  regulation	  of	  a	  particular	  faith	  group’s	  sacramental	  practice.	  The	  case	  had	  absolutely	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  denial	  of	  discretionary	  financial	  support,	  and	  everything	  to	  do	  with	  animus	  toward	  a	  particular,	  unpopular	  faith.	  	  	  The	  other	  Religion	  Clause	  decisions	  on	  which	  the	  TLC	  opinion	  relies	  all	  include	  dicta	  about	  sectarian	  discrimination,	  not	  generic	  exclusion	  of	  churches	  or	  church	  schools	  from	  public	  support.22	  	  Indeed,	  without	  a	  hint	  of	  irony,	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts	  cites	  
Everson	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  of	  Ewing,23	  in	  which	  all	  nine	  Justices	  emphatically	  embraced	  the	  proposition	  that	  a	  state	  may	  not	  directly	  assist	  church	  schools.	  	  	  	   The	  only	  other	  non-­‐discrimination	  decisions	  mentioned	  in	  TLC	  involve	  free	  speech	  claims	  of	  equal	  access	  to	  government	  created	  fora;24	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause	  played	  no	  part	  in	  any	  of	  them.	  	  Moreover,	  like	  McDaniel	  v.	  Paty,	  these	  decisions	  involved	  denial	  of	  separate	  constitutional	  rights	  to	  religious	  persons	  or	  groups,	  not	  the	  denial	  of	  discretionary	  funds	  to	  religious	  entities.	  	  Consider	  the	  elaborate	  and	  longstanding	  body	  of	  constitutional	  law	  that	  these	  seven	  Justices	  wholly	  ignored.	  	  	  Starting	  with	  Everson	  in	  1947,	  and	  continuing	  unabated	  through	  the	  Court’s	  most	  recent	  encounters	  with	  challenges	  to	  funding	  schemes	  on	  Establishment	  Clause	  grounds,25	  virtually	  every	  Justice	  has	  subscribed	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  state	  may	  not	  directly	  finance	  the	  religious	  mission	  of	  churches	  or	  church	  schools.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  decisions	  in	  this	  fifty-­‐plus	  year	  span	  have	  involved	  religiously	  affiliated	  schools.	  None	  have	  involved	  direct	  grants	  to	  houses	  of	  worship,	  because	  the	  constitutional	  barrier	  to	  such	  transfers	  has	  been	  so	  deeply	  understood	  and	  widely	  respected,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  both	  modern	  Establishment	  Clause	  law	  and	  the	  historical	  tradition	  of	  church-­‐state	  relations	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  	  From	  the	  early	  1970s	  until	  the	  late	  1990s,	  the	  Court	  adopted	  a	  prophylactic	  rule	  that	  barred	  direct	  aid	  from	  government	  to	  “pervasively	  sectarian”	  institutions.26	  The	  Court	  reasoned	  that	  aid	  to	  such	  institutions	  would	  inevitably	  advance	  religion,	  and	  any	  effort	  to	  prevent	  that	  advancement	  would	  excessively	  entangle	  the	  state	  and	  the	  church.27	  	  The	  decisions	  that	  generated	  this	  rule	  all	  involved	  schools,	  usually	  elementary	  and	  secondary.	  	  	  Given	  that	  the	  Court	  deemed	  such	  schools	  “pervasively	  sectarian,”	  even	  though	  they	  taught	  secular	  subjects,	  the	  constitutional	  status	  of	  houses	  of	  worship	  was	  obvious.	  	  Thus,	  with	  respect	  to	  programs	  of	  direct	  aid,	  it	  was	  constitutionally	  unquestioned	  that	  “no	  churches	  need	  apply,”	  because	  the	  Constitution	  barred	  the	  government	  from	  responding	  affirmatively.	  	  This	  was	  anything	  but	  invidious	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  508	  U.S.	  520	  (1993).	  22	  Emp.	  Div.	  v.	  Smith,	  494	  U.S.	  872	  (1990);	  Lyng	  v.	  Northwest	  Indian	  Cemetery	  Protective	  Ass'n,	  485	  U.S.	  439	  (1988);	  Everson	  v.	  Bd.	  of	  Educ.,	  330	  U.S.	  1	  (1947).	  23	  330	  U.S.	  1	  (1947).	  24	  Rosenberger,	  515	  U.S.	  819;	  Lamb’s	  Chapel,	  508	  U.S.	  384;	  Widmar,	  454	  U.S.	  263.	  25	  Mitchell	  v.	  Helms,	  530	  U.S.	  793	  (2000);	  Zelman	  v.	  Simmons-­‐Harris,	  536	  U.S.	  639	  (2002).	  26	  Lemon	  v.	  Kurtzman,	  403	  US.	  602,	  638	  (1971)	  (Douglas,	  J.,	  concurring);	  Tilton	  v.	  Richardson,	  403	  U.S.	  672,	  685-­‐686	  (1971);	  Hunt	  v.	  McNair,	  413	  U.S.	  734,	  743	  (1973).	  27	  Lemon,	  403	  U.S.	  at	  613-­‐14.	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discrimination.	  	  As	  well	  understood	  and	  oft	  repeated,28	  this	  barrier	  to	  direct	  aid	  kept	  the	  state	  from	  assuming	  responsibility	  for	  religious	  worship	  and	  indoctrination,	  and	  kept	  religious	  communities	  free	  from	  the	  state’s	  control.29	  	  As	  recently	  as	  1988,	  all	  nine	  Justices	  confirmed	  these	  longstanding	  constitutional	  norms.	  In	  Bowen	  v.	  Kendrick,	  30	  the	  Court	  divided	  5-­‐4	  on	  the	  permissibility	  of	  federal	  grants—some	  to	  religiously	  affiliated	  providers—for	  the	  purpose	  of	  teaching	  sexual	  abstinence.	  The	  Court’s	  majority	  upheld	  the	  grant	  scheme	  on	  its	  face,	  but	  insisted	  that	  on	  remand	  the	  lower	  courts	  be	  sure	  that	  the	  grants	  not	  go	  to	  “pervasively	  sectarian”	  entities	  or	  be	  used	  to	  pay	  for	  “specifically	  religious	  activities”	  such	  as	  religious	  teaching	  on	  the	  reasons	  for	  sexual	  abstinence	  outside	  of	  marriage.31	  	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  relevant	  law	  of	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  has	  changed	  in	  the	  thirty	  years	  since	  Bowen	  v.	  Kendrick.	  	  Justice	  O’Connor	  led	  the	  movement	  away	  from	  the	  prophylactic	  rule	  about	  sectarian	  entities.	  Instead,	  she	  argued	  for	  an	  approach	  that	  focused	  on	  whether	  the	  aid	  had	  a	  secular	  purpose	  and	  character,	  and	  whether	  the	  program	  had	  adequate	  safeguards	  against	  religious	  use	  of	  the	  aid.32	  Thus,	  in	  
Mitchell	  v.	  Helms,33	  the	  Court	  in	  2000	  upheld	  a	  program	  of	  aid	  to	  schools,	  public	  and	  private	  (including	  religiously	  affiliated	  schools),	  of	  materials	  useful	  for	  instruction,	  including	  computers.	  	  A	  plurality	  of	  four	  Justices	  would	  have	  sustained	  the	  program	  based	  on	  its	  secular	  educational	  purpose,	  coupled	  with	  its	  evenhanded	  treatment	  of	  secular	  and	  religious	  schools.34	  	  Justices	  O’Connor	  and	  Breyer	  joined	  in	  a	  narrower,	  and	  legally	  controlling,	  concurrence,	  in	  which	  they	  emphasized	  that	  the	  program	  included	  adequate	  safeguards	  against	  diversion	  of	  the	  aid	  to	  religious	  use,	  and	  that	  it	  involved	  the	  transfer	  of	  goods	  in	  kind,	  not	  cash.35	  
Mitchell,	  which	  Justice	  Sotomayor’s	  dissent	  in	  TLC	  appropriately	  emphasized,36	  is	  the	  Court’s	  last	  word	  on	  direct	  financing	  of	  religious	  entities.	  In	  
Zelman	  v.	  Simmons-­‐Harris,37	  decided	  two	  years	  after	  Mitchell,	  a	  5-­‐4	  majority	  upheld	  Ohio’s	  use	  of	  publicly	  financed	  school	  vouchers,	  redeemable	  at	  both	  secular	  and	  religious	  private	  schools	  in	  Cleveland.	  	  In	  Zelman,	  the	  Court	  emphasized	  that	  state	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  See,	  e.g.,	  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2027-­‐41,	  and	  sources	  cited	  therein	  (Sotomayor,	  J.,	  dissenting)	  29	  Although	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  and	  limited	  government	  should	  be	  self	  evident,	  many	  fail	  to	  understand	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  for	  religious	  liberty.	  	  Government	  funds,	  for	  example,	  almost	  invariably	  come	  with	  conditions.	  	  Though	  a	  religious	  community	  is	  free	  to	  accept	  those	  conditions,	  it	  may	  not	  recognize	  the	  potential	  intrusiveness	  of	  government	  monitoring	  that	  the	  law	  requires,	  especially	  when	  the	  grantee	  poses	  a	  significant	  threat	  of	  using	  the	  aid	  for	  religious	  purposes.	  30	  487	  U.S.	  589	  (1988).	  31	  Id.	  at	  621.	  32	  Agostini	  v.	  Felton,	  521	  U.S.	  203	  (1997)	  (overruling	  Aguilar	  v.	  Felton,	  473	  U.S.	  402	  (1985)).	  33	  530	  U.S.	  793	  (2000).	  34	  Id.	  at	  801-­‐835	  (Thomas,	  J.,	  joined	  by	  Rehnquist,	  C.J.,	  and	  Scalia	  and	  Kennedy,	  JJ.).	  35	  Id.	  at	  	  (O’Connor,	  J.,	  joined	  by	  Breyer,	  J.,	  concurring).	  36	  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2030-­‐31(Sotomayor,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  37	  536	  U.S.	  639.	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funding	  flowed	  to	  religious	  schools	  only	  through	  the	  independent	  decisions	  of	  families,	  and	  that	  students	  had	  a	  meaningful	  choice	  between	  religious	  schools	  and	  others,	  including	  the	  public	  schools.	  	  	  Since	  Zelman,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  decided	  no	  cases	  on	  the	  merits	  of	  Establishment	  Clause	  challenges	  to	  government	  funding	  programs.38	  Its	  only	  decisions	  in	  the	  area	  have	  involved	  questions	  of	  taxpayer	  standing	  to	  challenge	  such	  programs,	  direct39	  or	  indirect,40	  and	  both	  of	  those	  decisions	  narrowed	  the	  standing	  of	  taxpayers.	  	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  those	  narrowing	  moves,	  cases	  involving	  Establishment	  Clause	  challenges	  to	  government	  funding	  programs	  have	  been	  dramatically	  reduced	  in	  frequency.	  	  Nevertheless,	  nothing	  in	  Zelman	  or	  Mitchell	  suggested	  that	  the	  constitutional	  bar	  on	  direct	  aid	  to	  the	  religious	  mission	  of	  religiously	  affiliated	  schools	  had	  been	  eliminated	  or	  weakened.	  	  Thus,	  legal	  developments	  over	  the	  last	  fifteen	  years	  have	  not	  altered	  the	  rules	  that	  limit	  the	  government’s	  power	  to	  fund	  religious	  institutions,	  including	  houses	  of	  worship.	  	  	  Indeed,	  a	  grant	  to	  Trinity	  Lutheran	  Church	  to	  improve	  a	  playground	  used	  by	  its	  pre-­‐school	  would	  raise	  quite	  serious	  Establishment	  Clause	  issues	  under	  those	  governing	  norms.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  Missouri	  failed	  to	  raise	  those	  issues,	  but	  such	  a	  questionable	  litigation	  decision	  should	  not	  bind	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  evaluating	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  grant	  denial.41	  	  The	  TLC	  pre-­‐school	  has	  an	  explicit	  religious	  mission,	  as	  a	  ministry	  fully	  integrated	  within	  the	  Church.	  The	  school	  “teaches	  a	  Christian	  world	  view	  to	  children	  of	  [both	  members	  and	  non-­‐members	  of	  the	  church	  enrolled	  in	  the	  school].”42	  	  There	  is	  every	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  this	  Christian	  teaching	  would	  occur	  on	  the	  newly	  resurfaced	  playground.	  	  	  As	  Justice	  Sotomayor	  noted,	  “the	  Scrap	  Tire	  Program	  requires	  an	  applicant	  to	  certify	  .	  .	  .	  that	  its	  mission	  and	  activities	  are	  secular	  and	  that	  it	  will	  put	  program	  funds	  only	  to	  secular	  use.”43	  	  We	  have	  no	  idea	  whether	  the	  Department	  of	  Natural	  Resources	  will	  now	  adopt	  safeguards	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  religious	  pre-­‐school	  may	  not	  use	  the	  playground	  for	  specifically	  religious	  activities.	  	  If	  such	  safeguards	  are	  put	  in	  place,	  the	  state’s	  need	  to	  monitor	  compliance	  with	  those	  safeguards	  might	  present	  issues	  of	  constitutionally	  forbidden	  entanglements	  with	  church	  officials.	  	  Even	  if	  the	  Missouri	  grant	  program	  could	  be	  structured	  in	  ways	  that	  avoid	  Establishment	  Clause	  concerns—a	  question	  on	  which	  there	  is	  serious	  reason	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Of	  the	  current	  nine	  Members	  of	  the	  Court,	  five	  (Chief	  Justice	  Roberts,	  and	  Justices	  Alito,	  Sotomayor,	  Kagan,	  and	  Gorsuch)	  had	  never	  participated	  in	  a	  Supreme	  Court	  case	  involving	  state	  funding	  of	  religious	  entities.	  	  But	  the	  relevant	  law	  in	  these	  cases	  is	  no	  secret,	  and	  Justice	  Sotomayor	  had	  no	  difficulty	  in	  identifying	  the	  relevant	  constitutional	  law	  and	  history.	  	  The	  other	  four	  of	  the	  five	  newcomers	  just	  ignored	  all	  of	  that.	  	  39	  Hein	  v.	  Freedom	  from	  Religion	  Foundation,	  Inc.,	  551	  U.S.	  587	  (2007).	  40	  Arizona	  Christian	  School	  Tuition	  Org.	  v.	  Winn,	  563	  U.S.	  125	  (2011).	  41	  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2028	  (Sotomayor,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  42	  Id.	  at	  2027.	  43	  Id.	  at	  2019	  n.3.	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doubt—there	  remains	  the	  question	  of	  “play	  in	  the	  joints”	  between	  the	  Religion	  Clauses.	  	  At	  all	  levels	  of	  government,	  including	  the	  federal	  government,	  there	  may	  be	  reasons	  to	  accommodate	  religious	  institutions	  more	  than	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause	  requires.	  Similarly,	  government	  may	  have	  reasons	  to	  decline	  support	  for	  religious	  institutions,	  even	  if	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  would	  permit	  such	  aid.	  	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  at	  the	  state	  level,	  because	  many	  jurisdictions	  have	  strong	  and	  longstanding	  constitutional	  norms	  against	  funding	  of	  houses	  of	  worship.	  	  In	  cases	  where	  states	  have	  excluded	  religious	  entities	  from	  programs	  of	  discretionary	  funding,	  courts	  in	  the	  not-­‐distant	  past	  have	  regularly	  declined	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause.44	  	  	  	  In	  light	  of	  this	  consistent	  constitutional	  practice,	  the	  TLC	  Court’s	  treatment	  of	  
Locke	  v.	  Davey45	  seems	  remarkably	  dismissive,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  hostile.	  	  	  In	  Locke,	  the	  Court	  (7-­‐2)	  upheld	  the	  policy	  of	  Washington	  State	  that	  its	  constitution	  precluded	  Promise	  Scholarship	  recipients	  from	  using	  the	  grant	  to	  pursue	  a	  degree	  in	  devotional	  theology.	  As	  the	  Locke	  Court	  noted,	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  was	  not	  a	  barrier	  to	  Washington	  State’s	  allowing	  the	  scholarships	  to	  be	  put	  to	  that	  use,	  because	  the	  scholarships	  involved	  the	  private	  choice	  of	  scholarship	  recipients.46	  Nonetheless,	  the	  Court	  respected	  the	  state’s	  decision	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  restrictive	  policy	  on	  government	  aid	  for	  religious	  experience.47	  	  Missouri	  thus	  argued	  in	  TLC	  that	  the	  discretion	  recognized	  in	  Locke	  supported	  its	  choice	  to	  refuse	  to	  fund	  playground	  improvements	  at	  church	  schools.	  	  The	  Court’s	  response	  to	  this	  argument	  in	  TLC	  is	  striking	  in	  several	  respects.	  	  	  We	  note	  that	  the	  first	  several	  paragraphs	  in	  the	  analytic	  section	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts’s	  opinion	  are,	  to	  a	  startling	  degree,	  an	  elaborate	  paraphrase	  of	  the	  first	  several	  paragraphs	  of	  Justice	  Scalia’s	  dissent	  in	  Locke.48	  That	  dissent	  opens	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  	  After	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled,	  in	  Witters	  v.	  Wash.	  Dept.	  of	  Services	  for	  the	  Blind,	  474	  U.S.	  481	  (1986),	  that	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  did	  not	  forbid	  Washington	  State	  to	  use	  its	  voucher	  program	  to	  pay	  tuition	  at	  a	  Bible	  College,	  the	  Washington	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  state	  constitution	  nevertheless	  prohibited	  the	  payment.	  	  	  Witters	  v.	  State	  Comm’n	  for	  the	  Blind,	  771	  P.2d	  1119,	  1122	  (Wa.	  1989).	  For	  similar	  decisions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  county	  tuition	  payments	  to	  private	  schools,	  see	  Strout	  v.	  Albanese,	  178	  F.3d	  57	  (1st	  Cir.	  1999),	  cert.	  denied,	  528	  U.S.	  931	  (1999);	  Bagley	  v.	  Raymond	  Sch.	  Dist.,	  728	  A.2d	  127	  (Me.	  1999),	  cert.	  denied,	  528	  U.S.	  947	  (1999);	  Chittenden	  Town	  Sch.	  Dist.	  v.	  Vermont	  Dept.	  of	  Educ.,	  738	  A.2d	  539	  (Vt.	  1999),	  cert.	  denied,	  528	  U.S.	  1066	  (1999).	  If	  states	  may	  exclude	  religious	  schools	  from	  such	  programs,	  the	  case	  for	  exclusion	  of	  houses	  of	  worship	  is	  overwhelming.	  45	  540	  U.S.	  712	  (2004).	  For	  comprehensive	  and	  quite	  distinct	  analyses	  of	  Locke	  and	  questions	  of	  state	  discretion	  to	  exclude	  religion	  from	  public	  benefit	  programs,	  see	  Douglas	  Laycock,	  Theology	  
Scholarships,	  The	  Pledge	  of	  Allegiance,	  and	  Religious	  Liberty:	  Avoiding	  the	  Extremes	  But	  Missing	  the	  
Liberty,	  118	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  155	  (2004);	  Ira	  C.	  Lupu	  &	  Robert	  W.	  Tuttle,	  Federalism	  and	  Faith,	  55	  EMORY	  L.J.	  19	  (2006);	  Jesse	  Merriam,	  Finding	  a	  Ceiling	  in	  a	  Circular	  Room:	  Locke	  v.	  Davey,	  Federalism,	  and	  
Religious	  Neutrality,	  16	  TEMP.	  POL.	  &	  CIV.	  RTS.	  L.	  REV.	  103	  (2006);	  Nelson	  Tebbe,	  Excluding	  Religion,	  156	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.	  1263	  (2008).	  46	  Locke,	  540	  U.S.	  at	  719.	  47	  Id.	  at	  720-­‐725.	  48	  Compare	  id.	  at	  726-­‐731	  (Scalia,	  J.,	  dissenting)	  with	  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2019-­‐21.	  For	  the	  Court	  in	  TLC	  to	  do	  this	  without	  attribution	  to	  the	  Locke	  dissent	  is	  deeply	  puzzling,	  to	  say	  the	  least.	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discussion	  of	  Lukumi,	  Everson,	  McDaniel,	  Lyng,	  and	  Smith.	  The	  TLC	  opinion	  is	  nearly	  identical	  in	  both	  sequence	  and	  emphasis.	  	  	  	  Proceeding	  from	  this	  presumptively	  hostile	  attitude	  toward	  state	  discretion	  in	  this	  context,	  the	  TLC	  opinion	  emphasizes	  that	  Joshua	  Davey	  was	  denied	  funding	  because	  of	  what	  he	  “proposed	  to	  do”	  (prepare	  for	  ministry),	  while	  Trinity	  Lutheran	  was	  denied	  funding	  “because	  of	  what	  it	  is—a	  church.”	  The	  latter,	  the	  Court	  says,	  effectively	  demands	  that	  the	  church	  “renounce	  its	  religious	  character	  in	  order	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  otherwise	  generally	  available	  public	  benefit	  program,	  for	  which	  it	  is	  fully	  qualified.”49	  	  With	  all	  respect,	  we	  can	  say	  only	  that	  the	  Court’s	  distinction	  between	  conduct	  and	  identity	  is	  accurate,	  but	  it	  misses	  entirely	  the	  reason	  behind	  Missouri’s	  constitutional	  policy.	  	  The	  point	  of	  the	  restriction	  on	  playground	  grants	  is	  not	  to	  use	  the	  state’s	  leverage	  over	  applicants	  to	  induce	  them	  to	  alter	  their	  character.	  Rather,	  the	  restriction	  furthers	  the	  same	  policies	  as	  the	  prophylactic	  rule	  that	  the	  Court	  had	  followed	  for	  years	  in	  Establishment	  Clause	  cases,	  and	  that	  state	  constitutions	  have	  expressly	  required	  for	  more	  than	  two	  centuries.50	  Churches,	  because	  of	  what	  they	  
are,	  will	  normally	  use	  their	  assets	  (including	  real	  property	  assets,	  like	  a	  playground	  adjacent	  to	  the	  church)	  for	  religious	  uses,	  such	  as	  instruction	  in	  the	  faith.	  	  The	  funding	  restriction	  flows	  from	  the	  recognition	  that	  aiding	  churches	  in	  this	  way	  will	  make	  the	  state	  a	  partner	  with	  the	  church	  in	  providing	  religious	  experience.	  	  	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts’s	  distinction	  between	  conduct	  (Davey’s)	  and	  identity	  (a	  church)	  is	  thus	  just	  another	  way	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  avoid	  engagement	  with	  centuries	  of	  church-­‐state	  policies	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  under	  which	  houses	  of	  worship	  would	  rarely	  be	  “fully	  qualified”	  for	  direct	  government	  assistance.	  	  	  
	  
TLC	  is	  a	  case	  about	  federalism	  as	  well	  as	  religion,	  because	  it	  required	  the	  Court	  to	  weigh	  the	  state’s	  interest	  in	  its	  own	  constitutional	  law.	  Certainly,	  that	  interest	  deserved	  more	  credit	  than	  the	  Court	  opinion	  acknowledged.	  Federalism	  concerns	  are	  multiplied	  by	  the	  variety	  of	  contexts,	  arising	  state	  to	  state,	  in	  which	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  religious	  entities	  is	  a	  crucial	  constitutional	  variable.	  	  A	  ruling	  about	  playgrounds	  in	  Missouri	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  broad	  implications	  for	  decisions	  about	  schools	  or	  social	  services	  in	  other	  states.	  Yet	  a	  reader	  of	  the	  Court	  opinion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2024.	  50	  The	  full	  list	  of	  state	  constitutional	  provisions	  are	  in	  Justice	  Sotomayor’s	  dissent	  in	  TLC.	  	  Trinity	  
Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2037	  n.10	  and	  n.11(Sotomayor,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  The	  amicus	  brief	  filed	  in	  support	  of	  Missouri	  by	  the	  Baptist	  Joint	  Committee	  on	  Religious	  Liberty	  and	  the	  General	  Synod	  of	  the	  United	  Church	  of	  Christ	  very	  ably	  stated	  the	  case	  for	  the	  longstanding	  principle	  of	  separation	  in	  funding	  matters.	  Trinity	  Lutheran	  Church	  of	  Columbia,	  Inc.	  v.	  Pauley,	  Brief	  of	  Baptist	  Joint	  Committee	  for	  Religious	  Liberty	  and	  General	  Synod	  of	  the	  United	  Church	  of	  Christ	  as	  Amici	  Curiae	  in	  Support	  of	  Respondent	  6-­‐21,	  available	  at	  http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/2016/07/15-­‐577-­‐BJC-­‐Amici-­‐Respondent.pdf.	  It	  also	  assembled	  material	  on	  state	  constitutions.	  Id.	  at	  Appendix	  1.	  	  It	  is	  at	  least	  curious	  that	  Justices	  who	  are	  prominent	  members	  of	  the	  Federalist	  Society	  would	  be	  so	  indifferent	  to	  this	  thick	  history	  of	  state	  constitutional	  concern.	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would	  be	  forgiven	  for	  thinking	  such	  broad	  concerns	  of	  federalism	  played	  almost	  no	  part	  in	  the	  decision.	  	  In	  separate	  and	  brief	  concurring	  opinions	  in	  TLC,	  Justice	  Thomas	  (who	  dissented	  in	  Locke)	  and	  Justice	  Gorsuch	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  Locke	  is	  constitutionally	  dubious.51	  Most	  significantly,	  Gorsuch	  challenged	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  distinction	  between	  religious	  conduct	  and	  religious	  identity.	  Religious	  people	  do	  religious	  things,	  Gorsuch	  tells	  us,	  so	  the	  distinction	  between	  religious	  identity	  and	  religious	  exercise	  cannot	  be	  sustained.	  	  Thus,	  he	  says,	  the	  constitution	  requires	  the	  same	  protection	  against	  the	  denial	  of	  funds	  to	  religious	  entities	  as	  it	  does	  with	  respect	  to	  religiously	  motivated	  conduct	  by	  individuals.	  52	  	  More	  than	  anything	  else	  written	  by	  the	  Justices	  who	  support	  the	  TLC	  result,	  Justice	  Gorsuch’s	  claim	  explicitly	  repudiates	  hundreds	  of	  years	  of	  American	  constitutional	  experience.	  	  To	  paraphrase	  the	  Everson	  Court,	  the	  prohibition	  on	  state	  establishment	  of	  religion	  means	  “at	  least”	  that	  the	  state	  may	  not	  finance	  the	  people’s	  efforts	  at	  religious	  instruction	  through	  houses	  of	  worship.53	  	  	  If	  Justice	  Gorsuch	  is	  correct,	  however,	  state	  support	  of	  secular	  instruction	  without	  equivalent	  support	  of	  religious	  teaching	  is	  tantamount	  to	  unconstitutional	  discrimination	  against	  religious	  education.	  	  Justice	  Gorsuch	  thus	  goes	  far	  beyond	  the	  Court’s	  willingness	  to	  require	  equal	  funding	  of	  churches,	  with	  respect	  to	  secular	  concerns	  like	  playground	  safety.	  Gorsuch	  would	  extend	  this	  obligation	  of	  equal	  funding	  to	  include	  government	  support	  of	  explicitly	  religious	  activity	  whenever	  that	  activity	  has	  a	  secular	  counterpart.54	  	  	  	  	  Gorsuch	  makes	  this	  exact	  point	  in	  the	  very	  next	  paragraph,	  which	  begins:	  “Second,	  and	  for	  similar	  reasons,	  I	  am	  unable	  to	  join	  the	  footnoted	  observation,	  ante,	  at	  15	  ,	  n.	  3	  that	  ‘this	  case	  involves	  express	  discrimination	  based	  on	  religious	  identity	  with	  respect	  to	  playground	  resurfacing.’”	  	  That	  observation	  involves	  only	  undisputed	  fact,	  so	  the	  only	  possible	  object	  of	  the	  refusal	  by	  Gorsuch	  and	  Thomas	  to	  join	  the	  footnote	  is	  its	  one	  additional	  sentence:	  “We	  do	  not	  address	  religious	  uses	  of	  funding	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  discrimination.”	  	  The	  footnote,	  which	  only	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts,	  and	  Justices	  Kennedy,	  Alito,	  and	  Kagan	  joined,	  carefully	  leaves	  for	  another	  day	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  government	  may	  exclude	  from	  funding	  religious	  organizations	  that	  will	  use	  the	  aid	  for	  explicitly	  religious	  activities—for	  example,	  Bible	  reading	  in	  a	  literacy	  class,	  or	  religiously	  themed	  instruction	  about	  sexual	  abstinence	  outside	  of	  marriage.	  	  For	  Gorsuch	  and	  Thomas,	  any	  exclusion	  of	  those	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Justices	  Thomas	  and	  Gorsuch	  each	  joined	  the	  other’s	  opinion,	  both	  concurring	  in	  part.	  52	  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2025-­‐26	  (Gorsuch,	  J.,	  concurring).	  53	  Everson,	  330	  U.S.	  at	  15-­‐16.	  54	  Justice	  Sotomayor’s	  dissent,	  joined	  by	  Justice	  Ginsburg,	  similarly	  viewed	  the	  religious	  character	  of	  houses	  of	  worship	  as	  indicative	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  religious	  activity,	  but	  they	  drew	  the	  precisely	  opposite	  and	  once-­‐traditional	  conclusion—that	  the	  constitution	  bars	  the	  state	  from	  directly	  subsidizing	  houses	  of	  worship,	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  permits	  the	  state	  to	  refrain	  from	  such	  funding.	  
Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2038-­‐39	  (Sotomayor,	  J.,	  dissenting).	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activities	  from	  a	  general	  funding	  program	  would	  violate	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause.	  This	  stance,	  quite	  simply,	  turns	  Everson	  and	  the	  constitutional	  tradition	  it	  expresses	  totally	  on	  their	  heads.	  	  Moreover,	  Justice	  Gorsuch	  ignores	  his	  own	  recent	  and	  strenuous	  claims	  about	  the	  proper	  role	  of	  judges.	  	  	  Writing	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  2016	  (after	  Justice	  Scalia’s	  death	  and	  well	  before	  the	  2016	  election),	  Justice	  Gorsuch	  said	  this:55	  	  [T]he	  great	  project	  of	  Justice	  Scalia’s	  career	  was	  to	  remind	  us	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  judges	  and	  legislators.	  To	  remind	  us	  that	  legislators	  may	  appeal	  to	  their	  own	  moral	  convictions	  and	  to	  claims	  about	  social	  utility	  to	  reshape	  the	  law	  as	  they	  think	  it	  should	  be	  in	  the	  future.	  But	  that	  judges	  should	  do	  none	  of	  these	  things	  in	  a	  democratic	  society.	  That	  judges	  should	  instead	  strive	  (if	  humanly	  and	  so	  imperfectly)	  to	  apply	  the	  law	  as	  it	  is,	  focusing	  backward,	  not	  forward,	  and	  looking	  to	  text,	  structure,	  and	  history	  to	  decide	  what	  a	  reasonable	  reader	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  events	  in	  question	  would	  have	  understood	  the	  law	  to	  be—not	  to	  decide	  cases	  based	  on	  their	  own	  moral	  convictions	  or	  the	  policy	  consequences	  they	  believe	  might	  serve	  society	  best.	  	  This	  is	  a	  committed	  statement	  of	  judicial	  methodology,	  and	  we	  are	  entitled	  to	  measure	  Justice	  Gorsuch’s	  work,	  including	  his	  concurring	  opinion	  in	  TLC,	  against	  it.	  	  Let’s	  start	  with	  the	  text	  of	  the	  relevant	  constitutional	  provision:	  “Congress	  shall	  make	  no	  law	  respecting	  an	  establishment	  of	  religion	  or	  prohibiting	  the	  free	  exercise	  thereof.”	  	  In	  TLC,	  Missouri	  had	  argued,	  quite	  plausibly,	  that	  its	  restriction	  on	  funding	  churches	  did	  not	  violate	  the	  Clause	  because	  it	  was	  not	  “prohibiting”	  religious	  exercise	  in	  any	  way.	  	  Here	  is	  Gorsuch	  in	  TLC,	  analyzing	  the	  words	  of	  the	  Clause:56	  	  	  	   First,	  the	  Court	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  a	  useful	  distinction	  might	  be	  drawn	  between	  laws	  that	  discriminate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  religious	  status	  and	  religious	  use.	  .	  .	  .	  	  	  .	  .	  .	  I	  [do	  not]	  see	  why	  the	  First	  Amendment’s	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause	  should	  care	  [about	  that	  distinction].	  After	  all,	  that	  Clause	  guarantees	  the	  free	  exercise	  of	  religion,	  not	  just	  the	  right	  to	  inward	  belief	  (or	  status).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Neil	  M.	  Gorsuch,	  Of	  Lions	  and	  Bears,	  Judges	  and	  Legislators,	  and	  the	  Legacy	  of	  Justice	  Scalia,	  66	  CASE	  W.	  RES.	  L.	  REV.	  905,	  906	  (2016).	  At	  his	  Supreme	  Court	  confirmation	  hearings,	  he	  repeated	  this	  judicial	  philosophy.	  See	  Seven	  Highlights	  from	  the	  Gorsuch	  Confirmation	  Hearings,	  N.Y.	  TIMES	  (March	  21,	  2017),	  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/us/politics/neil-­‐gorsuch-­‐confirmation-­‐hearings.html	  (quoting	  then-­‐Judge	  Goruch	  as	  saying	  “The	  Constitution	  doesn’t	  change.	  The	  world	  around	  us	  changes.”);	  see	  also	  What	  we	  learned	  from	  Neil	  Gorsuch’s	  marathon	  confirmation	  hearing,	  PBS	  NEWSHOUR	  (March	  21,	  2017),	  http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/learned-­‐neil-­‐gorsuchs-­‐marathon-­‐confirmation-­‐hearing/	  (reporting	  that	  then-­‐Judge	  Gorsuch	  espoused	  “selective	  originalism”).	  56	  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2025-­‐26	  (Gorsuch,	  J.,	  concurring).	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   We	  were	  initially	  puzzled	  by	  the	  odd	  locution	  of	  whether	  “the	  Free	  Exercise	  should	  care.”	  	  But	  the	  Justice’s	  next	  sentence,	  focused	  on	  the	  words	  “free	  exercise,”	  hints	  at	  an	  answer.	  This	  paragraph	  represents	  Gorsuch’s	  nod	  to	  textualism,	  but	  he	  focuses	  only	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  both	  the	  status	  and	  conduct	  of	  churches	  reflect	  the	  “exercise”	  of	  religion.	  	  No	  one	  disputes	  that	  in	  this	  case.	  	  What	  the	  parties	  dispute	  is	  whether	  a	  refusal	  to	  fund	  a	  church,	  an	  act	  consistent	  with	  longstanding	  norms	  of	  church-­‐state	  separation	  in	  financial	  matters,	  can	  plausibly	  be	  viewed	  as	  “prohibiting”	  that	  exercise.	  	  On	  that	  potentially	  dispositive	  textual	  question,	  Justice	  Gorsuch	  had	  nothing	  to	  say.	  	  Gorsuch’s	  claim	  to	  adhere	  to	  constitutional	  originalism	  offers	  only	  deeper	  embarrassment	  in	  his	  TLC	  concurrence.	  	  Recall	  his	  counsel	  to	  look	  “to	  text,	  structure,	  and	  history	  to	  decide	  what	  a	  reasonable	  reader	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  events	  in	  question	  would	  have	  understood	  the	  law	  to	  be.”	  His	  opinion	  completely	  avoided	  any	  mention	  of	  history,	  and	  it’s	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  why.	  	  The	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause,	  made	  applicable	  to	  the	  states	  by	  ratification	  of	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment	  in	  1868,57	  must	  be	  read	  in	  light	  of	  the	  then-­‐widespread	  constitutional	  norm	  against	  direct	  aid	  to	  houses	  of	  worship.	  Justice	  Gorsuch’s	  separate	  opinion	  never	  mentions	  the	  detailed	  history,	  offered	  by	  Justice	  Sotomayor,58	  showing	  that	  bans	  on	  state	  aid	  to	  houses	  of	  worship	  were	  common	  at	  the	  founding,	  and	  nearly	  uniform	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment.	  	  TLC	  was	  not	  a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  history	  is	  thin	  or	  obscure;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  history	  is	  thick	  and	  available	  to	  all.	  Justice	  Gorsuch	  apparently	  did	  not	  like	  what	  it	  demonstrated.	  	  	   If	  Justice	  Gorsuch	  disregarded	  these	  many	  state	  constitutional	  provisions	  because	  he	  viewed	  them	  as	  marks	  of	  anti-­‐Catholic	  discrimination—a	  popular	  trope	  in	  commentary	  on	  TLC	  immediately	  before	  and	  after	  the	  decision59—his	  concerns	  are	  both	  unvoiced	  and	  deeply	  misplaced.	  	  A	  true	  originalist	  does	  not	  keep	  secret	  his	  interpretation	  of	  the	  relevant	  history.	  	  Moreover,	  many	  of	  these	  state	  provisions,	  including	  Missouri’s,	  adopted	  language	  from	  late	  Eighteenth-­‐	  and	  early	  Nineteenth-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  first	  acknowledged	  the	  incorporation	  of	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause	  in	  Cantwell	  v.	  
Connecticut.	  310	  U.S.	  296	  (1940).	  	  A	  theory	  of	  incorporation	  that	  built	  on	  originalism	  would	  interpret	  the	  Clause	  the	  way	  it	  was	  understood	  in	  1868,	  when	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment	  was	  ratified.	  Such	  a	  theory	  would	  have	  to	  give	  considerable	  attention	  to	  the	  many,	  then-­‐extant	  state	  constitutional	  provisions	  that	  barred	  funding	  of	  religious	  entities.	  Professor	  Lash’s	  detailed	  and	  able	  study	  of	  free	  exercise	  norms	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Reconstruction	  gives	  no	  hint	  that	  the	  drafters	  and	  ratifiers	  of	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment	  saw	  these	  “no	  funding”	  provisions	  as	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  free	  exercise	  of	  religion.	  	  See	  generally	  Kurt	  T.	  Lash,	  The	  Second	  Adoption	  of	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause:	  Religious	  
Exemptions	  Under	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment,	  88	  Nw.	  U.	  L.	  Rev.	  1106	  (1994).	  58	  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2032-­‐39	  (Sotomayor,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  59	  See,	  e.g.,	  Philip	  Hamburger,	  Prejudice	  and	  the	  Blaine	  Amendments,	  First	  Things	  (June	  20,	  2017),	  https://www.firstthings.com/web-­‐exclusives/2017/06/prejudice-­‐and-­‐the-­‐blaine-­‐amendments;	  Marc	  DeGirolami,	  Where	  are	  the	  Blaine	  Amendments?	  Where	  is	  the	  Animus?,	  Mirror	  of	  Justice	  (June	  26,	  2017),	  http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2017/06/where-­‐are-­‐the-­‐blaine-­‐amendments-­‐where-­‐is-­‐the-­‐animus-­‐inquiry.html.	  
	   13	  
century	  state	  constitutions.	  	  The	  major	  disagreements	  during	  that	  era	  were	  entirely	  among	  Protestants.60	  	  	  	   TLC	  thus	  offered	  newly	  confirmed	  Justice	  Gorsuch	  a	  test	  of	  fidelity	  to	  his	  professed	  methodology	  of	  originalism,	  and	  he	  failed	  miserably.61	  Once	  he	  abandoned	  text	  and	  history,	  all	  he	  had	  left	  was	  his	  own	  forbidden	  territory	  “[of	  decid[ing]	  [the]	  case	  based	  on	  [his]	  own	  moral	  convictions	  or	  the	  policy	  consequences	  [he]	  believe	  might	  serve	  society	  best.”	  How	  disappointing—and	  revealing—that	  this	  failure	  came	  so	  starkly,	  dramatically,	  and	  quickly	  in	  his	  tenure	  on	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  
The	  Future	  of	  Church-­‐State	  Funding	  Principles	  in	  Light	  of	  TLC	  
	  Within	  hours	  of	  the	  decision	  in	  TLC,	  journalists	  began	  to	  speculate	  on	  its	  consequences.62	  	  The	  Court	  encouraged	  this	  line	  of	  inquiry	  the	  next	  day	  when,	  in	  four	  cases,	  it	  granted	  certiorari,	  vacated	  lower	  court	  decisions,	  and	  remanded	  for	  reconsideration	  in	  light	  of	  TLC.63	  	  Three	  of	  the	  four	  had	  been	  decided	  by	  the	  Colorado	  Supreme	  Court,64	  and	  these	  all	  involved	  the	  use	  of	  school	  vouchers	  in	  one	  Colorado	  county.	  	  The	  fourth,	  from	  the	  New	  Mexico	  Supreme	  Court,	  involved	  loans	  of	  schoolbooks	  to	  public	  and	  private	  schools.65	  	  In	  all	  four,	  the	  state	  courts	  had	  struck	  down	  the	  aid	  as	  violations	  of	  state	  constitutional	  restrictions	  on	  public	  support	  for	  non-­‐public	  schools.	  	  This	  remand	  provoked	  the	  obvious	  question	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  See,	  e.g.,	  The	  Virginia	  Act	  for	  Religious	  Freedom	  (1786)	  (“[N]o	  man	  shall	  be	  compelled	  to	  frequent	  or	  support	  any	  religious	  worship,	  place,	  or	  ministry	  whatsoever	  .	  .	  .	  .”);	  Georgia	  Constitution	  of	  1789,	  Art.	  IV,	  §5	  (“All	  persons	  shall	  have	  the	  free	  exercise	  of	  religion,	  without	  being	  obliged	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  support	  of	  any	  religious	  profession	  but	  their	  own.”);	  Pennsylvania	  Constitution	  of	  1790,	  Art.	  IX,	  §3	  (“[N]o	  man	  can,	  of	  right,	  be	  compelled	  to	  attend,	  erect,	  or	  support	  any	  place	  of	  worship,	  or	  to	  maintain	  any	  ministry	  against	  his	  consent	  .	  .	  .	  .”;	  Connecticut	  Constitution	  of	  1818,	  Art.	  VII,	  §1	  (“[N]o	  person	  shall	  by	  law	  be	  compelled	  to	  join	  or	  support,	  nor	  be	  classed	  with,	  or	  associated	  to,	  any	  congregation,	  church	  or	  religious	  association.)	  The	  near-­‐unanimous	  ban	  in	  state	  constitutions	  on	  government-­‐imposed	  support	  for	  houses	  of	  worship	  reflects	  a	  fundamental	  shift	  in	  Protestantism	  from	  the	  mid-­‐Eighteenth	  century	  to	  the	  late	  Eighteenth	  and	  Nineteenth	  centuries.	  	  This	  shift	  reflects	  the	  growing	  centrality	  of	  voluntarism—the	  core	  of	  evangelicalism—in	  Protestant	  thought	  and	  belief.	  	  The	  believer	  demonstrates	  authentic	  faith	  only	  by	  free	  acceptance	  of	  salvation,	  free	  consent	  to	  join	  a	  particular	  denomination,	  and	  free	  support	  of	  that	  body.	  	  James	  H.	  Hutson,	  CHURCH	  AND	  STATE	  IN	  AMERICA:	  THE	  FIRST	  TWO	  CENTURIES	  165-­‐166	  (2008);	  Jon	  Butler,	  AWASH	  IN	  A	  SEA	  OF	  FAITH:	  CHRISTIANIZING	  THE	  AMERICAN	  PEOPLE	  262-­‐268	  (1992).	  61	  Nor	  did	  Justice	  Gorsuch	  make	  a	  case	  for	  following	  precedent	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  ignoring	  text	  and	  history.	  	  Note	  that	  in	  TLC	  he	  joins	  Justice	  Thomas	  in	  a	  concurring	  opinion	  that	  does	  its	  best	  to	  minimize	  the	  scope	  of	  Locke	  v.	  Davey,	  the	  most	  relevant	  precedent.	  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2025	  (Thomas,	  J.,	  concurring).	  62	  See,	  e.g.,	  Emma	  Green,	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  Strikes	  Down	  a	  Major	  Church-­‐State	  Barrier,	  THE	  ATLANTIC	  (June	  26,	  2017),	  https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/trinity-­‐lutheran/531399/	  	  63	  See	  Order	  List	  (June	  27,	  2017)	  available	  at	  https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062717zr_6537.pdf	  (orders	  in	  Nos.	  15-­‐556,	  15-­‐557,	  15-­‐558,	  and	  15-­‐1409).	  64	  Taxpayers	  for	  Public	  Educ.	  v.	  Douglas	  Co.	  School	  Dist.,	  351	  P.3d	  461	  (Co.	  2015).	  65	  Moses	  v.	  Skandera,	  367	  P.3d	  838	  (N.M.	  2015).	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whether	  TLC	  was	  going	  to	  further	  the	  school	  choice	  movement,	  which	  has	  long	  been	  hampered	  by	  various	  state	  constitutional	  restrictions.	  	  	   Eventually,	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  split	  among	  the	  seven	  Justices	  who	  agreed	  with	  the	  Court’s	  result	  will	  determine	  the	  impact	  of	  TLC	  on	  future	  controversies	  about	  equal	  funding.	  	  For	  now,	  we	  can	  confidently	  say	  that	  the	  votes	  of	  these	  Justices	  mask	  very	  deep	  divisions	  among	  them	  about	  Religion	  Clause	  and	  federalism	  principles.	  	  Instead	  of	  viewing	  TLC	  as	  a	  7-­‐2	  decision,	  we	  think	  it	  is	  more	  appropriate	  to	  break	  the	  seven	  down	  into	  groups	  of	  four	  (Chief	  Justice	  Roberts,	  and	  Justices	  Kennedy,	  Alito,	  and	  Kagan),	  two	  (Justices	  Thomas	  and	  Gorsuch),	  and	  one	  (Justice	  Breyer).	  	  Justice	  Breyer’s	  opinion,	  which	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  “public	  benefit,”	  offers	  lower	  courts	  no	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  distinguish	  among	  the	  various	  benefits	  that	  would	  or	  would	  not	  be	  appropriate	  subjects	  of	  state	  support,	  and	  will	  likely	  be	  ignored.	  	  	  	   The	  struggle	  going	  forward	  will	  be	  among	  the	  other	  six	  Justices	  in	  the	  TLC	  majority.	  	  The	  crucial	  question	  will	  be	  those	  reserved	  in	  footnote	  3	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts’s	  opinion:	  “This	  case	  involves	  express	  discrimination	  based	  on	  religious	  identity	  with	  respect	  to	  playground	  resurfacing.	  We	  do	  not	  address	  religious	  uses	  of	  funding	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  discrimination.”	  As	  noted	  above,	  Justices	  Thomas	  and	  Gorsuch	  did	  not	  join	  that	  footnote,	  and	  their	  opinions	  would	  require	  funding	  of	  religious	  activities	  on	  terms	  equal	  to	  that	  provided	  to	  their	  secular	  counterparts.	  	  	  	  	   What	  remains	  unknown	  is	  how	  many	  of	  the	  four	  Justices	  who	  joined	  the	  footnote	  will	  ultimately	  side	  with	  Justices	  Gorsuch	  and	  Thomas.	  If	  it	  were	  three	  or	  more,	  the	  footnote	  (and	  Justice	  Gorsuch’s	  concurrence)	  would	  likely	  have	  not	  appeared.	  	  Thus,	  in	  extracting	  guidance	  from	  TLC,	  lower	  courts	  will	  face	  substantial	  uncertainty	  in	  discerning	  the	  correct	  principles	  to	  decide	  cases	  that	  involve	  funding	  of	  religious	  activities.66	  	  	   TLC	  should	  make	  no	  difference	  in	  the	  reconsideration	  of	  New	  Mexico	  
Association	  of	  Non-­‐Public	  Schools	  v.	  Moses.67	  The	  case	  involves	  a	  state	  program	  of	  book	  loans	  to	  schools,	  public	  and	  private	  (including	  religious	  schools).	  	  The	  program	  was	  structured	  as	  a	  loan	  to	  students	  and	  their	  families,	  similar	  to	  the	  program	  upheld	  against	  an	  Establishment	  Clause	  challenge	  in	  Board	  of	  Education	  v.	  Allen.68	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  As	  noted	  above,	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts,	  Justice	  Alito,	  and	  Justice	  Kagan	  have	  not	  participated	  in	  any	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  that	  reached	  the	  merits	  of	  Establishment	  Clause	  questions	  about	  funding	  religious	  activities.	  	  Justice	  Kennedy	  joined	  the	  Mitchell	  plurality,	  530	  U.S.	  at	  801-­‐835,	  but	  the	  in-­‐kind	  aid	  in	  that	  case	  had	  been	  restricted	  to	  secular	  use.	  Moreover,	  the	  plurality	  in	  Mitchell	  characterized	  the	  case	  as	  involving	  private,	  intermediary	  choice,	  because	  aid	  was	  distributed	  to	  schools	  on	  a	  per	  capita	  basis.	  	  Id.	  at	  830-­‐831.	  	  So	  even	  Justice	  Kennedy	  has	  not	  expressed	  a	  view	  about	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  religious	  use	  of	  direct	  aid,	  other	  than	  in	  Bowen,	  where	  he	  joined	  an	  opinion	  that	  precluded	  such	  use.	  487	  U.S.	  at	  621.	  	  See	  text	  accompanying	  notes	  29-­‐30	  supra.	  67	  Moses,	  367	  P.3d	  838.	  68	  Board	  of	  Educ.	  v.	  Allen,	  392	  U.S.	  236	  (1968).	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Article	  XII,	  section	  3	  of	  the	  New	  Mexico	  Constitution,	  however,	  which	  outlaws	  use	  of	  state	  funds	  “for	  the	  support	  of	  any	  sectarian,	  denominational	  or	  private	  school,	  college	  or	  university,”	  is	  much	  broader	  and	  more	  specific	  than	  the	  Establishment	  Clause.	  	  The	  state	  Supreme	  Court	  focused	  on	  the	  sweeping	  exclusion	  of	  “any	  sectarian,	  denominational	  or	  private	  school,”	  and	  concluded	  that	  the	  provision	  was	  designed	  to	  protect	  resources	  for	  the	  public	  schools.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  book	  loan	  program	  violated	  the	  state	  constitution	  by	  aiding	  all	  private	  schools.	  Thus,	  the	  state	  Supreme	  Court	  decision—like	  the	  state	  constitution	  itself—did	  not	  single	  out	  religious	  schools	  for	  disfavored	  treatment.	  	  We	  strongly	  suspect	  that	  the	  language	  in	  TLC’s	  footnote	  3	  with	  respect	  to	  “other	  forms	  of	  discrimination”	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  New	  Mexico’s	  distinction	  between	  public	  schools	  and	  private	  schools.	  	  But	  New	  Mexico’s	  constitutional	  policy	  does	  not	  especially	  burden	  religious	  education.	  	  Instead,	  it	  is	  an	  affirmative	  policy	  of	  protecting	  public	  education	  against	  rivals	  for	  public	  support.69	  	  Nothing	  in	  the	  Gorsuch-­‐Thomas	  view	  or	  the	  Court	  opinion	  in	  TLC	  addresses	  this	  kind	  of	  distinction,	  one	  which	  tends	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  education	  law	  of	  virtually	  every	  state.	  We	  are	  deeply	  confident	  that	  the	  outcome	  in	  New	  Mexico	  will	  remain	  the	  same.70	  	  The	  Colorado	  decisions,	  on	  remand,	  could	  present	  a	  closer	  question.	  	  Douglas	  County	  created	  a	  scholarship	  program,	  which	  paid	  approximately	  $4500	  per	  year	  for	  each	  recipient	  toward	  tuition	  at	  participating	  private	  schools.71	  The	  trial	  court	  found	  that,	  in	  the	  initial	  program	  year	  of	  2011-­‐12,	  271	  students	  received	  a	  scholarship.	  Of	  23	  participating	  schools,	  16	  were	  religious	  in	  character.	  	  Over	  90%	  of	  scholarship	  recipients	  attended	  religious	  schools.	  	  At	  the	  high	  school	  level,	  119	  of	  120	  students	  were	  enrolled	  in	  religious	  schools,	  and	  the	  only	  non-­‐religious	  participating	  schools	  were	  limited	  to	  “gifted”	  or	  “special	  needs”	  students.	  	  The	  state	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  program	  was	  inconsistent	  with	  Art.	  IX,	  section	  7	  of	  the	  Colorado	  Constitution,	  which	  bars	  state	  or	  local	  governmental	  assistance	  to	  religious	  schools.72	  Because	  the	  program	  involved	  intermediary	  choice,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  In	  a	  comparable	  case	  in	  Michigan,	  a	  state	  court	  recently	  rejected	  the	  argument	  that	  TLC	  should	  have	  any	  bearing	  on	  application	  of	  a	  state	  constitutional	  provision	  denying	  public	  aid	  to	  all	  private	  schools.	  Council	  of	  Organizations	  and	  Others	  for	  Education	  about	  Parochiaid	  v.	  State	  of	  Michigan,	  available	  here:	  http://www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/2017-­‐07-­‐25_Opinion__Prelim_Injunction.pdf.	  	  See	  discussion	  of	  the	  Michigan	  decision	  at	  Howard	  Friedman,	  
Trinity	  Lutheran	  Decision	  Does	  Not	  Apply	  to	  Neutral	  Ban	  on	  Funds	  to	  Private	  Schools,	  Religion	  Clause	  (July	  28,	  2017),	  http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2017/07/trinity-­‐lutheran-­‐decision-­‐does-­‐not.html.	  70	  The	  defenders	  of	  the	  New	  Mexico	  book	  loan	  program	  apparently	  attempted	  to	  litigate	  the	  case	  as	  an	  attack,	  on	  grounds	  of	  anti-­‐Catholic	  animus,	  on	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  state’s	  constitutional	  restriction	  on	  aiding	  private	  schools.	  But	  the	  New	  Mexico	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  unreceptive	  to	  that	  attack,	  and	  nothing	  in	  TLC	  invites	  any	  different	  response.	  	  71	  Taxpayers	  for	  Public	  Educ.,	  351	  P.3d	  at	  465-­‐66.	  Under	  the	  County’s	  funding	  scheme	  for	  the	  vouchers,	  the	  County’s	  public	  school	  district	  received	  from	  the	  state	  100%	  of	  the	  state’s	  allocated	  per	  pupil	  expenditure.	  	  The	  district	  kept	  25%,	  and	  paid	  75%	  to	  the	  private	  school	  where	  the	  student	  was	  enrolled.	  	  72	  The	  portion	  quoted	  by	  the	  Colorado	  Supreme	  Court	  is	  as	  follows:	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Zelman	  probably	  insulated	  from	  successful	  attack	  under	  the	  federal	  Establishment	  Clause.	  But,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  under	  most	  state	  constitutions,	  the	  relevant	  limitation	  prohibits	  any	  state	  or	  local	  “aid	  [to]	  any	  church	  or	  sectarian	  society,	  or	  for	  any	  sectarian	  purpose,	  or	  to	  help	  support	  or	  sustain	  any	  school,	  academy,	  seminary,	  college,	  university	  or	  other	  literary	  or	  scientific	  institution,	  controlled	  by	  any	  church	  or	  sectarian	  denomination	  whatsoever	  .	  .	  .	  .”	  	  	  The	  Colorado	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled,	  4-­‐3,	  that	  the	  provision	  covered	  all	  religious	  schools,	  and	  that	  the	  program	  unconstitutionally	  aided	  such	  schools	  by	  contributing	  to	  tuition	  payments.73	  	  	  What	  should	  the	  Colorado	  Supreme	  Court	  do	  on	  remand	  in	  light	  of	  TLC?	  	  Unlike	  the	  Missouri	  program	  at	  issue	  in	  TLC,	  in	  which	  at	  least	  four	  Justices	  in	  the	  majority	  treated	  the	  case	  as	  not	  involving	  “religious	  uses,”	  the	  Douglas	  County	  scholarship	  program	  involves	  subsidy	  of	  such	  uses	  for	  all	  students	  that	  attend	  a	  school	  with	  a	  religious	  character.74	  	  Because	  of	  footnote	  3,	  TLC	  leaves	  entirely	  open	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  state	  violates	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause	  when	  it	  bars	  indirect	  government	  support	  for	  religious	  education.	  	  	  	  Despite	  the	  utter	  failure	  of	  guidance	  from	  TLC,	  the	  Colorado	  Supreme	  Court	  should	  be	  guided	  by	  the	  crucial	  difference	  between	  the	  facts	  of	  that	  case	  and	  the	  Douglas	  County	  litigation.	  	  The	  trial	  court	  enjoined	  the	  Douglas	  County	  program	  in	  its	  entirety,	  not	  just	  as	  applied	  to	  religious	  schools,	  and	  the	  state	  Supreme	  Court	  affirmed	  that	  grant	  of	  relief.75	  Plainly	  and	  simply,	  the	  Colorado	  case	  does	  not	  involve	  discrimination	  against	  religious	  schools.	  Unlike	  in	  Missouri,	  where	  secular	  schools	  could	  obtain	  playground-­‐resurfacing	  grants	  but	  church	  schools	  could	  not,	  the	  Colorado	  courts	  barred	  Douglas	  County	  from	  paying	  scholarships	  to	  any	  private	  school.	  	  Equal	  treatment	  mandates	  may	  be	  satisfied	  by	  equalizing	  down	  as	  well	  as	  by	  equalizing	  up,	  and	  that	  is	  what	  the	  Colorado	  Supreme	  Court	  did	  in	  its	  initial	  decision.	  	  So,	  just	  as	  in	  New	  Mexico,	  we	  expect	  no	  different	  outcome	  on	  remand,	  and	  we	  expect	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  leave	  the	  case	  undisturbed	  thereafter.76	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Aid	  to	  private	  schools,	  churches,	  sectarian	  purpose,	  forbidden.	  Neither	  the	  general	  assembly,	  nor	  any	  county,	  city,	  town,	  township,	  school	  district	  or	  other	  public	  corporation,	  shall	  ever	  make	  any	  appropriation,	  or	  pay	  from	  any	  public	  fund	  or	  moneys	  whatever,	  anything	  in	  aid	  of	  any	  church	  or	  sectarian	  society,	  or	  for	  any	  sectarian	  purpose,	  or	  to	  help	  support	  or	  sustain	  any	  school,	  academy,	  seminary,	  college,	  university	  or	  other	  literary	  or	  scientific	  institution,	  controlled	  by	  any	  church	  or	  sectarian	  denomination	  whatsoever	  .	  .	  .	  .	  
Id.	  at	  470.	  The	  Court	  construed	  “sectarian”	  to	  mean	  “religious,”	  so	  all	  religiously	  affiliated	  private	  schools	  were	  equally	  precluded	  from	  receiving	  public	  funds.	  Id.	  73	  Schools	  were	  free	  to	  reduce	  their	  own	  financial	  aid	  to	  students	  who	  received	  a	  scholarship	  from	  the	  County,	  and	  to	  take	  applicants’	  religious	  beliefs	  into	  account	  in	  admissions.	  Id.	  at	  465-­‐66.	  74	  That	  the	  subsidy	  may	  be	  “indirect”	  is	  wholly	  immaterial	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  effectively	  supports	  religious	  use.	  	  Locke	  v.	  Davey,	  which	  involved	  college	  scholarships,	  was	  identical	  in	  that	  respect,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  quite	  properly	  treated	  the	  case	  as	  involving	  a	  refusal	  to	  subsidize	  a	  religious	  use—in	  that	  case,	  study	  for	  the	  ministry.	  Locke,	  540	  U.S.	  at	  721-­‐723.	  75	  Taxpayers	  for	  Public	  Educ.,	  351	  P.3d	  at	  465,	  475.	  76	  The	  Colorado	  Supreme	  Court	  gave	  short	  shrift	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  its	  constitutional	  limitation	  on	  aid	  to	  religious	  schools	  was	  a	  product	  of	  anti-­‐Catholic	  animus,	  and	  therefore	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  federal	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  The	  school	  choice	  movement	  may	  be	  disappointed	  with	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  remands	  in	  these	  cases,	  but	  TLC	  will	  inevitably	  invite	  litigation	  in	  related	  circumstances,	  far	  more	  conducive	  to	  applying	  its	  equal	  treatment	  norms.	  	  When	  government	  financially	  supports	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  and	  imposes	  a	  restriction	  on	  religious	  content	  of	  those	  services,	  potential	  grantees	  that	  provide	  religious	  service	  are	  likely	  to	  claim	  unconstitutional	  discrimination.	  	  For	  example,	  religiously	  affiliated	  schools	  may	  obtain	  public	  charters	  and	  therefore	  receive	  full	  state	  financial	  support	  for	  each	  pupil,	  but	  under	  longstanding	  federal	  constitutional	  law	  these	  schools	  may	  not	  engage	  in	  religious	  worship	  or	  teaching.	  	  Around	  the	  United	  States,	  these	  restrictions	  on	  “religious	  uses”	  of	  the	  curriculum	  have	  led	  to	  significant	  conflicts	  with	  charter	  schools	  over	  a	  variety	  of	  religious	  practices,	  including	  use	  of	  the	  Bible;77	  engaging	  in	  Islamic	  worship;78	  and	  teaching	  Judaism	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  curriculum.79	  	  	  	  Armed	  with	  TLC,	  lawyers	  for	  religiously	  oriented	  charter	  schools	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  state	  is	  discriminating	  in	  favor	  of	  secular	  charter	  schools.	  For	  example,	  secular	  charter	  schools	  may	  promote	  their	  own	  approaches	  to	  civil	  rights	  or	  environmental	  concerns.	  	  In	  sharp	  contrast,	  a	  religiously	  oriented	  charter	  school	  may	  not	  similarly	  promote	  its	  doctrines	  in	  these	  subjects	  without	  risk	  of	  violating	  the	  Establishment	  Clause.	  	  If	  TLC	  is	  read,	  as	  Justices	  Gorsuch	  and	  Thomas	  would	  have	  it,	  to	  presumptively	  preclude	  restrictions	  on	  religious	  use	  when	  secular	  analogues	  are	  not	  similarly	  restricted,	  religiously	  oriented	  charter	  schools	  would	  suddenly	  have	  a	  very	  good	  case	  to	  be	  free	  to	  engage	  in	  religious	  instruction	  and	  perhaps	  even	  worship.	  Whether	  any	  of	  the	  four	  Justices	  who	  joined	  note	  3	  in	  TLC	  would	  follow	  this	  path	  is	  unknowable.	  	  What	  is	  immediately	  obvious,	  however,	  is	  that	  this	  move,	  if	  successful,	  would	  turn	  the	  relevant	  Religion	  Clause	  law	  upside	  down.	  	  Rather	  than	  religious	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Constitution.	  Id.	  at	  471.	  Nothing	  in	  TLC	  gives	  the	  slightest	  encouragement	  to	  that	  theory	  of	  the	  case	  on	  remand.	  No	  Justice	  in	  TLC	  even	  mentioned	  it.	  	  77	  	  The	  Nampa	  Classical	  Academy	  in	  Idaho	  has	  been	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  conflict	  over	  permissible	  reading	  materials	  in	  a	  charter	  school.	  Howard	  Friedman,	  Court	  Rejects	  Charter	  School	  Challenge	  To	  
Ban	  On	  Classroom	  Use	  of	  Bible,	  Religion	  Clause	  (May	  18,	  2010),	  religionclause.blogspot.com/2010/05/in-­‐nampa-­‐classical-­‐academy-­‐v.html;	  Howard	  Friedman,	  9th	  
Circuit:	  Idaho	  Charter	  School	  Teachers	  Have	  No	  1st	  Amendment	  Right	  To	  Use	  Religious	  Texts,	  Religion	  Clause	  (Aug.	  18,	  2011),	  religionclause.blogspot.com/2011/08/9th-­‐circuit-­‐idaho-­‐charter-­‐school.html.	  	  78	  See	  Howard	  Friedman,	  Cultural	  Identity	  Charter	  School	  Ordered	  To	  Make	  Two	  Changes	  In	  
Operations,	  Religion	  Clause	  (May	  20,	  2008),	  	  religionclause.blogspot.com/2008/05/cultural-­‐identity-­‐charter-­‐school.html.	  79	  See	  Howard	  Friedman,	  Hebrew	  Curriculum	  Finally	  OK’d	  For	  Florida	  Charter	  School,	  Religion	  Clause	  (Sept.	  15,	  2007),	  religionclause.blogspot.com/2007/09/hebrew-­‐curriculum-­‐finally-­‐okd-­‐for.html;	  see	  
also	  Howard	  Friedman,	  D.C.	  Board	  Approves	  Hebrew	  Language	  Charter	  School,	  Religion	  Clause	  (Apr.	  25,	  2012),	  http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2012/04/dc-­‐board-­‐approves-­‐hebrew-­‐language.html.	  	  For	  other	  examples	  of	  controversy	  over	  religion	  in	  charter	  schools,	  see	  items	  collected	  at	  Religion	  Clause,	  	  religionclause.blogspot.com/search?q=charter+school.	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teaching	  and	  practice	  being	  barred	  in	  state	  supported	  schools,	  religiously	  affiliated	  charter	  schools	  would	  have	  constitutional	  rights	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  teaching	  and	  practice.	  Equalizing	  down	  is	  not	  a	  realistic	  option	  in	  this	  context,	  because	  it	  would	  require	  the	  complete	  elimination	  of	  charter	  schools.	  	  	  For	  another	  example,	  consider	  state-­‐supported	  social	  services,	  such	  as	  programs	  for	  rehabilitation	  from	  drug	  or	  alcohol	  addiction.	  The	  Faith	  Based	  and	  Community	  Initiative	  under	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush,80	  later	  renamed	  Faith	  Based	  and	  Neighborhood	  Partnerships	  under	  President	  Barack	  Obama,	  invites	  participation	  by	  organizations	  with	  a	  religious	  character	  in	  federally	  funded	  social	  service	  programs.	  	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  through	  today,	  however,	  federal	  regulations	  preclude	  grantees	  from	  engaging	  in	  explicitly	  religious	  activities	  in	  government-­‐funded	  programs.81	  	  The	  federal	  government	  imposed	  this	  restriction	  because	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  required	  it.	  	  Enter	  TLC.	  	  Religious	  social	  service	  providers,	  and	  states	  that	  want	  to	  aid	  them	  in	  their	  religious	  missions,	  may	  mount	  Free	  Exercise	  challenges	  to	  this	  restriction.	  After	  all,	  they	  will	  argue,	  secular	  providers	  are	  free	  to	  use	  their	  own	  methods	  of	  help	  or	  therapy.	  Why	  should	  those	  who	  prefer	  religious	  methods	  be	  subject	  to	  discrimination	  in	  their	  choice	  of	  methodology?	  	  	  Our	  analysis	  here	  is	  identical	  to	  our	  appraisal	  of	  the	  charter	  school	  problem.	  	  If	  the	  Gorsuch-­‐Thomas	  view	  eventually	  earns	  five	  votes,	  a	  constitutional	  prohibition82	  will	  be	  transformed	  into	  a	  constitutional	  mandate	  of	  equal	  treatment.	  	  Litigation	  aimed	  at	  securing	  that	  equal	  treatment	  may	  cause	  real	  harm	  to	  these	  social	  service	  programs,	  because	  states	  that	  forbid	  direct	  funding	  of	  religious	  experience	  could	  comply	  with	  both	  federal	  and	  state	  law	  only	  by	  funding	  neither	  secular	  nor	  religious	  providers.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  We	  describe	  and	  analyze	  the	  Initiative	  in	  detail	  in	  Ira	  C.	  Lupu	  &	  Robert	  W.	  Tuttle,	  The	  Faith-­‐Based	  
Initiative	  and	  the	  Constitution,	  55	  DEPAUL	  L.	  REV.	  1	  (2005).	  See	  also	  Ira	  C.	  Lupu	  &	  Robert	  W.	  Tuttle,	  SECULAR	  GOVERNMENT,	  RELIGIOUS	  PEOPLE	  106-­‐109.	  	  81	  Lupu	  &	  Tuttle,	  The	  Faith-­‐Based	  Initiative	  and	  the	  Constitution,	  supra	  note	  83,	  at	  10-­‐11.	  These	  policies	  were	  embodied	  in	  an	  Executive	  Order	  from	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  Exec.	  Order	  No.	  13,279,	  3	  C.F.R.	  258	  (2003),	  reprinted	  in	  5	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  601	  (1996	  &	  Supp.	  2005)	  (federal	  funds	  may	  not	  be	  used	  to	  support	  “inherently	  religious	  activities.”).	  	  President	  Obama	  later	  amended	  the	  Order	  to	  clarify	  that	  federal	  funds	  may	  not	  be	  used	  to	  directly	  support	  “explicitly	  religious	  activities.”	  See	  Executive	  Order—Fundamental	  Principles	  and	  Policymaking	  Criteria	  for	  Partnerships	  with	  Faith-­‐Based	  and	  Other	  Neighborhood	  Organizations	  §	  2(f)	  (Nov.	  17,	  2010),	  obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-­‐press-­‐office/2010/11/17/executive-­‐order-­‐fundamental-­‐principles-­‐and-­‐policymaking-­‐criteria-­‐partner.	  	  82	  See,	  e.g.,	  Freedom	  from	  Religion	  Foundation,	  Inc.	  v.	  McCallum,	  179	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  950	  (W.D.	  Wisc.	  2002)	  (holding	  that	  a	  direct	  grant	  from	  Wisconsin	  to	  a	  faith-­‐based	  program	  for	  substance-­‐abuse	  treatment	  violates	  the	  Establishment	  Clause).	  	  Note	  that	  grants	  from	  Wisconsin	  involving	  beneficiary	  choice,	  used	  at	  the	  same	  provider,	  are	  constitutionally	  permitted.	  	  Freedom	  from	  Religion	  Foundation,	  Inc.	  v.	  McCallum,	  324	  F.3d	  880	  (7th	  Cir.	  2003).	  We	  comprehensively	  analyze	  the	  constitutional	  treatment	  of	  direct	  and	  indirect	  financing	  of	  religious	  activities	  in	  Lupu	  &	  Tuttle,	  The	  
Faith-­‐Based	  Initiative	  and	  the	  Constitution,	  supra	  note	  83.	  
	   19	  
If	  all	  this	  were	  to	  transpire,	  the	  law	  of	  the	  Religion	  Clauses	  would	  be	  radically	  transformed.	  	  And	  no	  one	  in	  TLC	  was	  hinting	  at	  anything	  close	  to	  this,	  except	  for	  Justice	  Sotomayor	  as	  she	  opened	  her	  dissent:	  “This	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  case	  about	  recycling	  tires	  to	  resurface	  a	  playground.	  	  The	  stakes	  are	  higher.”83	  	  
CONCLUSION	  	  As	  this	  essay	  demonstrates,	  the	  changes	  that	  TLC	  will	  bring	  about,	  in	  principles	  of	  church-­‐state	  relations	  and	  federalism,	  are	  quite	  unpredictable.	  	  But	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  Court	  opinion	  does	  not	  inspire	  confidence	  that	  those	  who	  joined,	  including	  Justice	  Kagan,	  embrace	  any	  commitment	  to	  church-­‐state	  separation	  in	  funding	  matters,	  or	  to	  federalism	  principles	  that	  will	  permit	  states	  to	  follow	  their	  own	  longstanding	  policies	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  	  	  Not	  long	  ago,	  the	  one	  rock	  solid	  element	  in	  Establishment	  Clause	  law	  seemed	  to	  be	  that	  government	  could	  not	  make	  direct	  grants	  to	  houses	  of	  worship,	  especially	  in	  circumstances	  where	  the	  funds	  would	  support	  religious	  activity.	  	  TLC	  has	  thrown	  that	  paradigm	  of	  church-­‐state	  relations	  into	  deep	  question.	  	  What’s	  more,	  TLC	  threatens	  a	  leap	  beyond	  state	  discretion	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  spending	  to	  a	  strenuous	  new	  paradigm	  of	  mandatory	  equality	  for	  religion,	  in	  which	  spending	  for	  secular	  experience	  must	  be	  accompanied	  by	  comparable	  spending	  for	  religious	  experience.	  	  Only	  two	  Justices,	  however,	  have	  signaled	  a	  willingness	  to	  go	  that	  far,	  while	  four	  others	  have	  reserved	  judgment.	  	  We	  wonder	  whether	  the	  old	  paradigm	  will	  endure,	  or	  whether	  a	  radically	  different	  one	  –	  false	  to	  our	  constitutional	  history	  –	  is	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  triumph.	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  Trinity	  Lutheran,	  137	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2027	  (Sotomayor,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  TLC,	  a	  large	  question	  lurking	  is	  whether	  laws	  that	  treat	  religious	  organizations	  more	  favorably	  than	  their	  secular	  counterparts	  are	  constitutionally	  troublesome.	  	  If	  so,	  a	  great	  many	  statutory	  accommodations	  of	  religion	  and	  religious	  organizations—including	  the	  Religious	  Freedom	  Restoration	  Act,	  42	  U.S.C.	  secs.	  2000bb	  –	  2000bb-­‐4,	  and	  the	  Religious	  Land	  Use	  and	  Institutionalized	  Persons	  Act,	  42	  U.S.C.	  secs.	  2000cc	  et	  seq.—are	  constitutionally	  questionable,	  and	  would	  have	  to	  be	  either	  struck	  down	  or	  extended	  to	  comparable	  secular	  concerns.	  We	  believe	  that	  not	  a	  single	  sitting	  Justice	  would	  support	  a	  sweeping	  norm	  of	  equality	  between	  religious	  and	  secular	  organizations,	  but	  nothing	  in	  TLC	  explains	  why	  its	  equality	  principle	  should	  not	  be	  fully	  symmetrical.	  	  Justice	  Stevens	  would	  have	  confronted	  his	  judicial	  colleagues	  on	  this.	  	  See	  City	  of	  Boerne	  v.	  Flores,	  521	  U.S.	  507,	  536-­‐537	  (1997)	  (Stevens,	  J.,	  concurring)	  (arguing	  that	  because	  RFRA	  prefers	  religion	  to	  irreligion,	  it	  is	  an	  unconstitutional	  establishment).	  	  
